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Preface & Acknowledgements
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed research projects-and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP's founding in 2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we serve as a "broker" to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past and hope this symposium will spark even more participation.
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior government official, "I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum I've found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters."
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year's event. It is a central tenet of the DoD's Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you're a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research.
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:
 
Introduction
A long-standing controversial issue that divides academics, government officials, elected representatives, and the defense industry is whether U.S. defense contractors earn abnormal or excessive profits at the expense of taxpayers. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA; 2010), the premier association representing the nation's best-known names in the aerospace and defense industries, has consistently insisted that "defense industry profitability lags significantly behind its industrial peers." On the other hand, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report in the 1980s found that defense contractors normally earned a higher return on assets (ROA) than their commercial counterparts. The primary metric AIA uses is operating margin, measured as operating profit (earnings before interest and tax, or EBIT) as a percentage of sales. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) issued a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)-sponsored report, "Defense Department Profit and Contract Finance Policies and Their Effects on Contract and Contractor Performance." The IDA report confirms that the operating margin of defense industry is lower than that of other sectors. However, the profit is "adequate" to sustain defense industry firms because they enjoy a more favorable financing structure under which the firm has much less of its own capital invested.
One might expect that as a more independent and relatively free-of-conflict-ofinterest source of research, the academic literature should have provided more concrete and scientific evidence on this critical issue. Unfortunately, this is not the case. First, for whatever reason, there is a long history of avoidance of military-related research among academics. As a result, studies in this field are quite limited. Second, the already limited studies on this topic stopped in the 1990s, leaving a blank for almost two decades. Early evidence on the issue of excessive profits is mixed. For example, Weidenbaum (1968) argued that defense profits are excessive. Bohi (1973) used a sample of 36 defense contractors and concluded that "there is no evidence for arguing that defense business is any more or less profitable than nondefense business in general." Agapos and Galloway (1970) stated that "there is almost no evidence that aerospace firms in contemporary America are able to reap unusually large or excessive profits" (p. 1103). Stigler and ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=385 -= Friedland (1971) documented that the profit rates of top defense contractors substantially exceeded those of comparable nondefense companies. In summary, there was no consensus among academics in 1960s and 1970s.
The studies in the 1980s and 1990s are less divided in that generally they support the proposition that defense industries earn higher profits than their non-defense peers (Carrington, 1986; Trueger, 1991) . For instance, Lichtenberg (1992) found that the ROA of defense contractors as a whole is 68-82% higher than that of non-contractors. Moreover, those firms with the most government contracts are almost three times as profitable as their benchmark firms. The major explanation of the excess profits of defense contractors is the cost-shifting hypothesis (Rogerson, 1992; Thomas & Tung, 1992) . According to this theory, a typical defense contractor has two types of revenue. The first stream of revenue derives from the DoD products whose prices are cost based and hence are cost sensitive. The other source of revenue is from typical commercial products whose prices are competition based and therefore are cost insensitive. Rogerson (1992) argued that a firm with a combination of defense products and commercial products will have an incentive to shift the common overhead costs from cost-insensitive segments to cost-sensitive segments. Because government contracts typically are reimbursed based on costs and, more importantly, the price is determined based on negotiation between the two parties and often renegotiated, this cost shifting strategy effectively results in the firm's higher profitability.
The early evidence has been quite consistent with the cost-shifting hypothesis. For instance, Thomas and Tung (1992) found that pension plans are overfunded when employees work on government contracts, and those excess pension assets are withdrawn when employees work on non-DoD products. Rogerson (1992) not only documented the excess profitability of defense contractors, but also found that the defense product segments are significantly less capital intensive than less government-oriented segments, which is consistent with the cost-shifting hypothesis that predicts an input substitution effect (between capital and direct labor). Specifically, the cost-shifting theory conjectures that the defense product sector uses excess direct labor because the overhead allocation is traditionally based on direct labor-based measures.
A more recent study casts doubt on the validity of the cost-shifting hypothesis. McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) confirmed that defense contractors enjoyed excess profit on their government work yet found no evidence of common overhead cost shifting. Specifically, they compared ROA among three types of segments within defense-contracting firms: (1) commercial segments, (2) government segments, and (3) mixed segments. The main testable hypothesis is as follows: if the cost-shifting theory underlies the excess profitability of defense contractors, one would expect to see the highest profit in the mixed segment, where managers have the most opportunities to shift common overhead costs. Opposite to what is expected, McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) found that either the government segments (not the mixed segments) significantly outperform the other two segments, or there is no significant difference across the three categories, depending on the specific time period examined. The overall evidence suggests that unusually high profitability is more likely due to non-accounting explanations than to strategic cost allocation.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we fill in an almost two-decade gap that was left blank by the literature. Specifically, using up-to-date data, we investigate whether defense contractors earn excessive profits. Our contribution to this goal is beyond a pure extension of the timeline. We employ an innovative measure of excessive profit based on a three-dimension match of firms on industry, year, and size. This novel approach better captures the "excess" of the defense contractors' profitability, if any exists. Secondly, given ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=386 -= that we have found the evidence supporting the existence of defense contractors' excessive profits and the lack of consensus on the explanation of excessive profits, we provide alternative predictors of excessive profitability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the Data section we describe our data. In the Empirical Analyses and Results section we introduce our industry-year-size matched excessive profit and the empirical results and findings based on this measure. In the Determinants of Excessive Profits section we hypothesize and find that industry consolidation after 1992 and the corporate governance quality are two determinants of excess profits. In the final section we conclude.
Data
Using Fedspending.org as the source, we first identified a list of the top 500 recipients (by dollars awarded) of defense contract awards for 2008. For each publicly traded company on the list, we used the stock ticker to merge with accounting data from the Compustat database. We were able to find a total of 112 public firms from this top 500 list. Table 1 reports the name, dollar awarded, rank, stock ticker, SIC code, and public stock exchange code for these 112 public firms. Table 1 shows that the vast majority of firms in our sample are either traded on the NYSE or NASDAQ, consistent with the perception that top defense prime contractors tend to be big and established companies. Moreover, they are DoD contracts with a wide spectrum of industries. Table 2 illustrates the distribution of industry membership measured by two-digit SIC codes. In particular, our 112 sample firms cover 24 unique industry sectors as defined by two-digit SIC. Table 3 presents basic statistics of various accounting measures for the 112 sample firms in fiscal year 2008. In particular, we report ROA, ROCE, total assets, revenue, profit ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=390 -= margin ratio (PMR), operating margin ratio (OMR), long-term debt ratio, and dollar awarded as percentage of revenue. The mean value of total assets and total revenue were $42 billion and $39 billion, respectively. The mean ROA (ROCE) was 5.76% (15.86%). Profit margin and operating margin averaged at about 5.19% and 9.76%, respectively. About 18% of assets were financed by long-term debt, and the government contracts contributed about 18% of the firms' 2008 revenue. 
Empirical Analyses and Results

Measuring Excessive Profits
A challenging issue that contributes to the controversy over defense contractors' excessive profits is the definition of excessive profits. We argue that some approaches are fundamentally flawed. For instance, a very common and seemingly sensible method is to compare the profitability measures of defense contractors with similar measures of the member firms of an index. In a recent report, the AIA (2010) used the following figure to make the point that "defense industry profitability lags significantly behind its industrial peers." This approach is also used by some defense-related research centers. A Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) working paper by Berteau, Levy, Ben-Ari, and Moore (2011) compared operating profit margins for the CSIS Defense, S&P 500, and S&P 1500 Industrial Indices between 1990 and 2010. Berteau et al. (2011) claimed that although the CSIS Defense Index's operating margin is higher today than at any point in the past 20 years, it has been consistently lower than those of the commercial indices.
Worrying about the explicit and implicit inferences drawn from the above "defense versus S&P index" comparisons, we asked the following question: What implications concerning defense contractors' excessive profits, if any, can be drawn from these figures? Our answer is none. Just because we observed that defense contractors' operating margin (or any other profitability measure) is lower than that of the S&P 500 index does not necessarily rule out the possibility of defense contractors' excessive profits. The major reason is that it's meaningless to use a very broadly defined index as the benchmark for inferring the defense contractors' normal profitability. The defense contractors, as a whole or as individual firms, and the broad market are two different animals. Even a narrowly defined index, such as a manufacturing index, is problematic. The bottom line is this: The defense contractors span a wide range of industries. For instance, our 112 public U.S. firms on the 2008 top 500 list cover 24 unique two-digit SIC codes. If measured by four-digit SIC codes, the number goes up to 56 industries! As McGahan and Porter (2002) pointed out, profitability is very industry-specific. Different industries have different risk exposures, competitions, and entry barriers, among many others. Therefore, given the wide industry representation of defense contractors, the correct benchmark for inferring defense contractors' normal profitability (and hence excessive profitability) must focus on the individual firm level. There is no one-size-fits-all benchmark, not the S&P, not a manufacturing index, not any readily available index. ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=392 -= Based on the theoretical literature, we propose an innovative measure to assess the excessive profitability of defense contractors. McGahan and Porter (2002) documented the importance of year and industry on accounting profitability. Moreover, extensive literature demonstrates that firm size should be considered in constructing a benchmark for comparison (Albuquerque, 2009; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1996) . Hence, we devised an industry-year-size matched excessive profit measure for each individual firm-year and in turn used it as the basis for analyzing our research questions.
Our excessive profit measure is defined as follows. First, we assumed that a significant contracting relationship continuity exists between the government and the defense contractors. Hence, we extended the use of our 2008 list of top defense contractors to all the other years as well. This likely introduces some noise into the data. However, because any noise only worked against finding any results, we were willing to sacrifice the power of the test in order to avoid extremely time-consuming data collection work. Second, for each of the 112 firms, we used their stock ticker to map into the Compustat database and extract various accounting variables across a wide range of years, 1950-2010. So a single firm on our list likely has multiple hits (each hit is a firm-year), depending on how long the firm has existed. Note that the maximum possible number of hits is 61 for any particular firm. We report that mapping our 112 firms to the Compustat database yields a total of 4,099 firm-years representing 110 firms (two tickers no hit). On average, the number of hits per firm is 37.26 with a min of four and a max of 61. Finally, for each of the 4,099 firm-years, we tried to find a benchmark firm-year whose profit becomes the proxy for "normal profit" of the firm-year investigated. The benchmark firm-year was selected based on a three-dimension match on industry, year, and size. Specifically, we went to the same industry-year where industry membership is defined as four-digit SIC codes and identified the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm that has the best size match with our defense firm-year. The difference between the profit of the firm-year investigated and the profit of the benchmark firm-year is the measure of "excessive profit." Notes. ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level, **** indicates less than 0.01% significance level. Excessive measures are derived based on an industry-year-size matching. Industry is defined as four-digit SIC while the size is defined as total assets. Notes. ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level, **** indicates less than 0.01% significance level. Excessive measures are derived based on an industry-year-size matching. Industry is defined as four-digit SIC while the size is defined as total revenue.
Empirical Results and Findings
Panel A of Table 5 (size matched by total assets) demonstrates that the average excessive ROA (ROCE) is 1.12% (3.65%), respectively, both statistically significant at less than 0.01% level. The excessive PMR is positive and has a mean of 0.28%, which is statistically significant at 5% level. The OMR, which is most often used by the defense industry to show the inferior profitability of the defense contractors, does appear to have a negative average excessive value. However, the magnitude (-0.09%) is too small to be statistically significant. Table 6 (size matched by revenue) provides similar evidence as Panel A of Table 5 except on OMR. The average excessive ROA (ROCE) is 1.04% (3.71%), respectively, both statistically significant at less than 0.01% level. The excessive PMR is positive and has a mean of 0.45%, which is statistically significant at 0.1% level. In contrast to Panel A, however, the OMR is positive and statistically significant as well, consistent with the other measures of profitability.
Panel B of
The overall evidence suggests that, measured by ROA, ROCE, and PMR, defense contractors consistently demonstrate superior profitability than their industry-year-size matched non-defense peers. Another important finding is that in contrast to what AIA claims, the OMR of defense contractors are at least not significantly lower than that of their industryyear-size matched non-defense peers.
Determinants of Excessive Profits
Time Series Variation Determinant: Industry Consolidation
We first investigated whether the industry consolidation in the past two decades has increased the defense contractors' excessive profit. In 1993, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Perry hosted a dinner that is now called "The Last Supper" with the CEOs of the major defense companies. During the dinner, Perry urged his guests to consolidate their industry because the DoD would no longer support the high infrastructure costs of a fragmented set of industries due to lower demand induced by the "peace dividend" from the end of the Cold War. As a result, a series of high-profile M&A happened in subsequent years including but not limited to the following cases: Boeing acquiring McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed acquiring Martin Marietta, and Northrop acquiring Grumman.
It is reasonable to assume that as the industry structure shifted toward a less competitive nature, the bargaining power in (re)negotiation as well as the political influence in the Pentagon of the largest defense contractors will increase. Consequently, more superior profit became attainable. Hence, we have the following hypotheses:
The defense contractors' excessive profitability relative to their industry peers became more pronounced after 1992.
To test H1, we regressed various measures of excessive profit onto a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the year is post 1992 and zero otherwise. Table 7 reports the regression results. Table 7 shows that excessive profitability, measured by ROA and PMR, increased after 1992. This result holds regardless of whether the size is matched by total assets or revenue. However, the magnitude of the increase, as well as the statistical significance of the change, is more pronounced if size is matched by revenue. We don't find any statistically significant difference in ROCE and OMR between pre-and post-1992 periods. Notes. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level
Because most dramatic defense industry consolidation happened after 1992, we believe that the above evidence reasonably supports the conjecture that the industry consolidation made the excessive profits of defense contractors more attainable.
Cross-Sectional Variation Determinant: Corporate Governance
Another possible determinant of excessive profit is the quality of corporate governance. Laffont and Tirole (1993) pointed out that the information asymmetry between the government and the contractors could give rise to the "extraction of information rents" that is associated with potential excessive profits. Based on this observation, we conjectured that a better governed corporation would be less likely to engage in such opportunistic and unethical "rent seeking" behavior. Hence, we have the following hypothesis:
H2: The defense contractors' excessive profitability relative to their industry peers increased with the poorer corporate governance.
To test H2, we referred to the finance literature for empirical measures of corporate governance. Several key governance mechanisms are documented to have impact on the governance quality. First, Jensen (1993) argued that the separation of CEO and chairman of the board is an important feature of good corporate governance because otherwise the CEO is given too much power and too little oversight. A number of other studies (Goyal & Park, 2002; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992 ) also supported the importance of the separation of CEO and chairman. Second, most researchers believe that the quality of oversight deteriorates when the board gets bigger due to "free-rider" problem (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Yermack, 1996) . Finally, board independence, as measured by the percentage of independent directors, plays a role in limiting the opportunistic behavior of the management arising from the conflict of interest (Brickley & James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) . We therefore regressed our various measures of excessive profit onto the corporate governance variables mentioned above. Table 8 reports the regression results. Note that we construct our corporate governance variables based on the firms' proxy statements and other relevant SEC filings. Notes. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level; CEO-Chairman dummy takes value of one if the CEO is also the chairman; board size is defined as number of directors; board independence is defined as the percentage of independent directors in the board. Table 8 shows that excessive profitability, measured by ROA and PMR, is higher for those firms with CEOs also holding title of the chairman of the board. This result holds regardless of whether the size is matched by total assets or revenue. Board size and board independence do not appear to have any impact on any measure of excessive profitability except that board size marginally affects the excessive profitability measured by OMR. Similar to Table 7 , we found few results in ROCE and OMR columns.
The Robustness Test
In the section titled Time Series Variation Determinant, we suggested that industry consolidation plays a role in determining excessive profits of defense contractors. Moreover, in the section titled Cross-Section Variation Determinant we found that the poorer quality of corporate governance measured by the duality of CEO and chairman of the board is positively associated with the excessive profits. Although unlikely, we cannot completely refute the possibility that these two factors, industry consolidation and corporate ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=396 -= governance, have confounding effects. To make sure one factor does not subsume the other, we ran a multiple regression by including both the post-1992 dummy and the CEOChairman dummy as independent variables. Table 9 reports the results.
The basic result of Table 9 is that the two determinants we identified in previous sections do not subsume each other. The magnitudes as well as statistical significances appear to be lower than seen in Tables 7 and 8 . However, the coefficients remain both statistically and economically significant. Notes. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level; alternatively, we also include the board size and the board independence in addition to these two dummy variables, and the results are little changed.
Conclusion
In this study, we used an innovative industry-year-size matched measure of excessive profit and investigated the long-controversial issue of the defense contractors' alleged superior profitability. Using alternative profit measures, our results indicate that defense contractors earn excessive profits relative to their industry peers. This result is strongest when profit is measured by ROA, ROCE, or PMR. The evidence of excessive profit is less consistent if profit is measured by OMR. Another important result from this research is that the defense contractors' excessive profit is more pronounced after 1992, consistent with the conjecture that the significant defense industry consolidation after 1992 enabled superior profitability due primarily to both the strong bargaining power and increased political influence of the remaining firms. A final research result is that poor corporate governance, as measured by the duality of the CEO and the chairman of the board, leads to defense contractors' higher excessive profitability.
Critique of "Defense vs. S&P Index " Approach Why Not Make Sense?
• Q: What implications concerning defense contractors' excessive profits, if any, can be drawn from the Figure 1? • It's meaningless to use a very broadly defined index as the benchmark for inferring the defense contractors' normal profitability. The defense contractors, as a whole or as individual firms, and the broad market, are two different animals.
• Even a narrowly defined index, such as a manufacturing index, is also problematic. The bottom line is: the defense contractors span a wide range of industries. For instance, our 112 public U.S. firms on the 2008 top 500 list cover 24 unique 2-digit-SIC codes. If measured by 4-digit-SIC codes, the number goes up to 56 industries!
• As pointed out by McGahan and Porter (2002) , profitability is very industry-specific. Different industries have different risk exposures, competitions, and entry barriers, among many others. Therefore given the wide industry representation of defense contractors, the correct benchmark for inferring defense contractors' normal profitability (and hence excessive profitability) must focus on the individual firm level.
• There is no one-size-fits-all benchmark, not the S&P, not a manufacturing index, not any readily available index.
• Based on the theoretical literature, we propose an industry-year-size matched measure to assess the excessive profitability of defense contractors.
McGahan and Porter (2002) document the importance of year and industry on accounting profitability. Extensive literature demonstrates that firm size should be considered in constructing a benchmark for comparison (Albuquerque 2009, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1996) . Hence, we devise an industry-year-size matched excessive profit measure for each individual firm-year and in turn use it as the basis for analyzing our research questions.
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Measuring Excessive Profits: Industry-Year-Size Matched Proxy
• For each of the 4,099 firm-years, we try to find a benchmark firm-year whose profit becomes the proxy for "normal profit" of the firm-year investigated.
• Specifically, we go to the same industry-year where industry membership is defined as 4-digit SIC codes, and identify the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm that has the best size match (where size is alternatively defined as either total assets or total revenue) with our defense firm-year.
• The difference between the profit of the firm-year investigated and the profit of the benchmark firm-year will be the measure of "excessive profit".
Empirical Results
• 
